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EXECUTIVE ACTION DIRECTIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: Executive Action Directive: The National Grid Manhattan Project — Securing the Bulk-Power System via Mandatory Air-Gapping, Comprehensive HEMP/GMD Physical Shielding, and Direct Military Execution

PREAMBLE & CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

When the United States faced an existential threat during World War II, national survival did not permit years of legislative debate, civilian administrative rule-making, or open-ended interagency studies. The Commander-in-Chief established the Manhattan Project directly under military authority to pool defense resources, bypass bureaucratic red tape, and execute with absolute operational velocity.

Today, pre-positioned foreign malware (e.g., Volt Typhoon), High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) weapons, and Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD) pose an equivalent existential threat to the American Bulk-Power System. Securing the national power grid is not a commercial utility issue; it is a primary national defense imperative.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America—including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), Title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4533) (DPA), and Title 10 of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. 2808 and 2214)—the Bulk-Power System is hereby placed on an immediate national defense footing under the National Grid Manhattan Project Directive.

SECTION 1. FINDINGS OF EXISTENTIAL THREAT AND EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION

(a) DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY AND FATALITY IMPACT.—The United States Bulk-Power System (BPS) is acutely vulnerable to High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) events, Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD), physical kinetic assault, and pre-positioned adversarial cyber intrusions. Official findings of the U.S. Congressional EMP Commission (Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, 2004/2008 Critical Infrastructures Reports) and formal testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security establish that a sustained, catastrophic grid failure lasting one year would lead to the collapse of critical water, sanitation, food distribution, and medical infrastructure, resulting in the death of up to 90 percent of the U.S. population within the first twelve months. Such vulnerability constitutes an unmitigated existential threat to national defense and national survival.

(b) EXPLOITATION OF LEAD-TIME GAP.—Adversarial actors have pre-positioned malicious software and backdoors within critical utility control components. Because domestic manufacturing lead times for Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) long-distance transformers average 2 to 3 years, relying exclusively on procurement restrictions leaves an unacceptable multi-year exposure window.

(c) IMMEDIATE SEVERANCE PRINCIPLE.—An embedded digital kill-switch cannot execute a trigger command without an active signal path. Mandatory physical air-gapping neutralizes pre-installed software threats instantly, providing an immediate operational firewall while domestic hardware manufacturing scales.

SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY & STANDARDS

(a) NATIONAL GRID SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICE (NGSPO).—There is established within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment the National Grid Security Program Office (NGSPO). Pursuant to executive reorganization authority under Title 10, the Director of the NGSPO shall report directly to the Under Secretary and possess direct military command authority over critical bulk-power defense infrastructure.

(b) DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RECLASSIFICATION.—The 500 most critical Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) Long-Distance Substations constituting the primary backbone of the United States Bulk-Power System are hereby designated as primary Defense Critical Infrastructure, subjecting them to direct Pentagon oversight and security standards.

(c) MANDATORY PHYSICAL ISOLATION (AIR GAPPING).—Pursuant to IEEPA authority (50 U.S.C. 1701), active internet, external network, or wireless interface connectivity to any EHV control system, Industrial Control System (ICS), or SCADA system controlling critical bulk-power infrastructure is declared an unmitigated national security threat.

(d) ENFORCEMENT DEADLINE.—All owners and operators of designated Defense Critical Infrastructure shall physically disconnect all public-facing, external, and wireless network interfaces within one hundred eighty (180) days of this Directive. Non-compliance shall result in the immediate suspension of operating clearance for defense-connected power lines.

SECTION 3. COMPREHENSIVE EMP/GMD HARDENING AND DOMESTIC MOBILIZATION

(a) MIL-STD-188-125-1 MANDATE.—The NGSPO shall execute immediate physical shielding and EMP/GMD hardening across the 500 designated EHV substations within forty-eight (48) months. All control houses, SCADA enclosures, and critical relay rooms shall be engineered to satisfy or exceed MIL-STD-188-125-1 standards, ensuring electromagnetic shielding effectiveness of at least 80 dB to 100 dB across the frequency spectrum.

(b) THREE-WAVEFORM PROTECTION.—Hardening mandates must explicitly protect against all three components of a nuclear HEMP event:

* E1 Pulse (Fast Waveform): Installation of solid-state surge arresters, high-speed line filters, and Faraday cage enclosures to prevent the destruction of microelectronics within nanoseconds.

* E2 Pulse (Intermediate Waveform): Heavy-duty transient voltage suppression to withstand lightning-like surge currents.

* E3 Pulse (Slow Waveform): Mandatory installation of neutral ground blocking capacitors on Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers to block Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) from saturating and overheating transformer cores.

(c) COLD SPARE FARADAY RESERVES.—Operators of designated EHV substations shall maintain on-site, pre-tested replacement control modules, digital relays, and critical sensors stored inside dedicated EMP-shielded containerized storage (Faraday enclosures) to guarantee localized replacement capability within hours of an event.

(d) DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT INCENTIVES.—Pursuant to Title III of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. 4533), the NGSPO is authorized to issue federal purchase guarantees, loan guarantees, and direct supply commitments to domestic manufacturers for Grain-Oriented Electrical Steel (GOES) and Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers to rapidly expand the domestic industrial base.

SECTION 4. BUDGET-NEUTRAL REALLOCATION OF FUNDS

(a) REALLOCATION OF UNOBLIGATED BALANCES.—This Directive requires zero new taxes and zero new federal outlays. Funding shall be derived entirely from existing, unobligated balances previously authorized and appropriated by Congress.

(b) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Pursuant to General Transfer Authority (10 U.S.C. 2214) and emergency military construction redirection authorities under 10 U.S.C. 2808, the Secretary of Defense is directed to audit and reallocate unobligated balances within Department of Defense Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts to fund the NGSPO and enforce compliance.

SECTION 5. ENFORCEMENT & PUBLIC OVERSIGHT

The Director of the NGSPO shall publish a biannual status report directly to the American public detailing Air Gapping verification metrics, MIL-STD physical shielding progress across the 500 EHV substations, cold spare inventory verifications, domestic GOES steel production milestones, and the removal of foreign-adversary network interface components.